Since all the units of General Clark's 5th Army had been employed, General Alexander, commander of all allied forces in Italy, decided to transfer three divisions from the 8th Army deployed on the Adriatic front. These would have formed a provisional corps, the II New Zealand Corps, whose task was to continue the action undertaken by the Americans and bypass Monte Cassino to plunge into the Liri Valley.
Of the three units sent, the 4th Indian Division relieved the Americans on the hills in front of Monte Cassino, the 2nd New Zealand Division stationed itself in front of the city of Cassino, while the 78th British Division was late in crossing the Apennines tightened under the grip of winter.
In particular, the 4th Indian Division was made up of six battalions with Indian troops led by English officers and three entirely English battalions.
Before launching the attack, General Freyberg, commander of the II New Zealand Corps, insistently carried out the request to bomb the Abbey of Montecassino originated by General Tuker, the British commander of the 4th Indian Division.
Both Freyberg and his subordinate commanders believed it was necessary to bomb the building which many thought had been the cause of the previous failed attacks. The bombing request sparked a controversy that continued even after the end of the war. In essence, American commanders, including Clark, were against the bombing, while British commanders were in favor.
The generals were not sure of the presence of enemy units inside the building, and the Germans had declared not to make military use of it. In any case, Freyberg believed that the abbey should be bombed with or without the Germans inside.
Finally General Alexander gave consent to the bombing.
At 9.30 on 15 February 1944 the bombing of the Abbey of Montecassino began. In successive waves, 230 aircraft of various types dropped 380 tons of bombs on their target.
The target was fully hit even if many bombs fell outside the area causing losses also to the allied troops. The destruction of the abbey was total and many civilians who had taken refuge within the walls of the monastery died in the disaster.
Due to a series of unforeseen events and misunderstandings, when the abbey was bombed the troops of the 4th Indian Division earmarked for the attack were not yet ready for action. Furthermore, according to the commanders at the front, before directly attacking the ruined building, it was necessary to occupy a nearby hill held by the Germans which prevented the approach.
Thus, on the evening of 15 February, only one company of riflemen set out to attack Hill 593, which was inexorably repelled with heavy losses.
The following evening the same hill was attacked by a battalion with the same result and further losses.
On the evening of 17 February, three battalions were deployed by the Indian division, two of which were ordered to directly attack the monastery. The fight was very hard, but at dawn on the 18th the attackers had to retreat once again.
The 1st German Parachute Division, which had assumed control of the sector a few days before, had given the attackers a hard time and began to deserve the fame that is still recognized today for the defense of Cassino.
On the evening of 17 February, while the Indians were leaving for their last attack towards the abbey, the 2nd New Zealand Division carried out an offensive action towards Cassino.
The land to the east of the town was soaked in water due to the rainfall, precluding the use of tanks, therefore General Kippenberger in command of the New Zealanders had chosen the route of the Rome – Naples railway line as the attack route towards Cassino.
But on the railway embankment the Germans had carried out twelve demolitions which consisted of deep chasms with barbed wire, mines and other obstacles. Two companies of Maori riflemen (under the New Zealand division) managed to reach and occupy the Cassino railway station during the night. But the sappers working hard behind them were unable to fill the last demolition before dawn and with daylight the German artillery made it impossible to continue the work. The Maori remained isolated, without the precious support of tanks, and on the afternoon of 18 February a German counterattack forced them to retreat.
That second, hasty and limited offensive brought no results to the Allies, but it strengthened the Germans' self-confidence.
After the end of the second battle, the Allied general staffs began to prepare a new strategic plan for the overrun la Gustav Line in which forces from both 5th and 8th Army would be involved. It was established that the new offensive would not begin before mid-May, not only to allow the units to organize themselves, but also to have favorable weather conditions and dry and compact terrain for the best use of the armored units.
While the operation was under consideration, General Freyberg obtained authorization to carry out a new limited attack to occupy Cassino town and the Abbey of Montecassino.
The generals at the highest level did not have excessive confidence in Freyberg's plan, but agreed to it because any success would make available a starting base in the Liri Valley to be used in the future major offensive, while in case of failure the losses would be only from the New Zealand and Indian divisions (which included only some English battalions) and this would not have created problems for the Americans and British.
This article, others articles by the same author and many more by other authors, are available here dalvolturnoacassino.it
Livio Cavallaro
Author of the following books:
Cassino 1944 – Le battaglie per la Linea Gustav, Mursia Editore, 2004.
Assalto a Massria Albaneta – Cassino 19 marzo 1944, Mattioli 1885 Editore, 2018.
Assalto a Cassino – La stazione, il castello, la collina, Mursia Editore 2024.
